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For the ﬁrst time, we present evidence on employee theft in the
UK using data on actual recorded crime. We present a model where
employees are ‘rational cheaters’ with ‘consciences’ to produce hy-
potheses about the role of labour market (wages, unemployment) and
social (age, education) inﬂuences on employee theft. We then examine
the role of these inﬂuences using regional crime data supplemented by
data from the LFS. Our results provide information on two compet-
ing views of motivations for crime and on policy to combat employee
crime.
JEL Classiﬁcation: J20, K14, K42, M5
Keywords: Employee crime, Labour markets
∗We are grateful to Steve Machin for advice concerning the LFS data and to Paul
Barnes. Any errors are our own.1 Introduction
Following Becker (1968)’s pioneering work, economists have been interested
in the study of criminal behaviour. This work has covered theoretical issues
in optimal deterrence (see Garoupa (1997) and Polinsky and Shavell (2000))
and empirical causes of this activity (for example, Witt et al. (1999) and
Machin and Meghir (2000)). Researchers have uncovered important links
between economic activity and types of crime. For example, Field (1999)
ﬁnds that rates of property crime growth are highly correlated with economic
growth while Fajnzylber et al. (2002) establish a relationship between income
inequality and violent crime across countries. A notable gap in this work,
recognised in 1989 by Dickens et al. (1989), relates to employee (or “occupa-
tional”) crime, which the Association of Certiﬁed Fraud Examiners (ACFE)
deﬁnes as “the use of one’s occupation for personal enrichment through the
deliberate misuse or misapplication of the employing organisation’s assets.”
(ACFE (2002), p. 2). The aim of this paper is to provide evidence on a
particular area of this crime: employee theft in the UK.
Employee theft constitutes a signiﬁcant portion of crimes committed
against businesses (by employees and others). In the US, Dickens et al. (1989)
reported transfers from businesses to workers of up to $56 billion in 1989.
More recently, ACFE (2002) attributes 87% of employee crime to “asset mis-
1appropriations”, with a median cost of $80,000. Recent evidence in the UK
also suggests a serious problem of employee theft. Although such oﬀences
recorded in England and Wales peaked in 1979, there has been a steady
rise in the employee theft rate, from around 29 crimes per 100,000 people
in 1995/96 up to around 33 crimes per 100,000 population by 1999/00. A
British Chambers of Commerce (BCC) survey (BCC (2002)) identiﬁed 12%
of crimes against its members as employee theft while research for the Scot-
tish Executive (Burrows et al. (2002)) indicated that 9% of ﬁrms across ﬁve
single-digit SIC industries suﬀered from this form of crime in 1998, on a total
of 26,812 occasions. Costings are not available but the BCC estimates that
crime against its members cost the UK £19 billion in 2001, and the 12% of
employee theft will contribute signiﬁcantly to this.1
Conceptually, Nagin et al. (2002) contrast three approaches to modelling
crime, regardless of type. The “rational cheater” model assumes that em-
ployees and employers commit and monitor crime on the basis of a familiar
cost-beneﬁt calculus. Dickens et al. (1989) and White (1992) both discuss
the causes of employee crime in this context. Alternatively, criminological
and psychological literature postulates a “conscience model” (where criminal
activity is the result of failing to care about acting illegally) and an “im-
1Of course, these direct costs are not the only ones associated with employee theft: in
addition to these, it is evident that ﬁrms spend scarce resources monitoring employees and
detecting crime. See Dickens et al. (1989), ACFE (2002) and Barnes and Lambell (2002).
2pulse control” model (where the immediacy of gains from crime outweigh
any longer term potential costs). A number of authors have sought to test
various implications of these approaches, in contexts beyond employee crime.
Thus, Nagin and Paternoster (1993) and Nagin et al. (2002) ﬁnd evidence to
support rational cheater and conscience models in contexts of general crime
and employee responses to incentive schemes. Barnes and Lambell (2002) ex-
amine the determinants of employee crime in a rational cheater model. They
ﬁnd systematic variations in perceived susceptability to fraud (linked to in-
dustry, organisational size and type, and respondent’s role). They interpret
their ﬁndings as supporting the model in question.
As already mentioned, the focus of our paper is employee theft in the
UK. In particular, to motivate our empirical work, we present a model of
employee theft that combines two of the above approaches: employees are
rational cheaters but they are also motivated by their innate “propensity
to oﬀend” (Nagin and Paternoster (1993))—i.e. an element of conscience.
We then examine the implications of this on a unique set of data containing
regional information on employee theft between the ﬁnancial years 1995/96
and 1999/00. Bearing in mind our model, we have augmented these data with
regional information from the LFS to produce a data set capable of examining
the role of labour markets, education and age in the employee crime decision.
The paper’s main contribution is the use of these data on recorded crime to
3examine the determinants of employee theft. Of the studies mentioned above,
only Nagin et al. (2002) have data on observed economic behaviour (though
not relating to employee theft). The others use experimental data and survey
evidence on perceptions of employee crime, both of which could fail to reﬂect
actual behaviour in the workplace. In contrast, ours is the ﬁrst paper seeking
to analyse data on recorded employee thefts. In addition, we provide a rare
examination of this issue in the UK and provide fresh information on the
extent to which rational cheating and conscience combine to inﬂuence the
decision to commit crime.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents a model
of individual employee crime that suggests several potential inﬂuences on
employee crime. Then, Section 3 describes our data and methods before
Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The model
In order to consider potential inﬂuences on employee crime we examine a
model of the individual employee’s crime decision. Consider an area k, with
Ik workers. We model employee i ∈ Ik’s crime decision as a two-stage one.
In the ﬁrst stage, she decides whether to commit a crime, then she decides
4how much crime to commit.2 The model is solved by backwards induction,
with the crime level decision being taken conditional on choosing to commit
a crime, and the crime decision being taken in anticipation of this.
If the employee commits a crime, her (risk neutral) expected utility is
EU
C
i = p(ei)(wi + ei) + [1 − p(ei)]viwi − ψ(ei,xi) (1)
where we have suppressed k for convenience. In (1), wi is the employee’s cur-
rent wage, vi is her probability of outside employment if the crime is detected
(since this results in dismissal and no wage), wi is the outside wage, p(ei) is
the probability of non-detection which is dependent on the employee’s crime
volume (ei) (we assume pei < 0,peiei > 0)3, ψ(ei,xi) is the cost of committing
crime to the employee and xi is her “propensity to commit crime” (Nagin
et al. (2002) also refer to this as the employee’s “conscience”): we assume
ψei,ψeiei > 0,ψxi,ψeixi < 0. Possible determinants of xi are considered be-
low but, as one example, it may be inﬂuenced by the employee’s age, with
2Our focus on the potential criminal’s decision does not endogenise the employer’s
monitoring strategy. In fact, it is readily shown that the predictions in Proposition 1
below are consistent with a Nash equilibrium in crime and monitoring (since this pro-
duces ambiguous comparative statics). Eﬀectively, we are assuming that employee eﬀects
would dominate in such a set-up. There is some empirical support for this view. Barnes
and Lambell (2002) ﬁnd that variations in employer monitoring activity do not inﬂuence
susceptibility to employee crime while in the ACFE’s survey ACFE (2002), 76% of cases
were attributed to a lack of, or an “ignored”, monitoring system. Finally, White (1992)
shows that even in a world of complete information with timely monitoring, employee
crime would be observed.
3We could add the employer’s monitoring eﬀort by assuming p(e,m),pm < 0.
5younger employees being more likely to consider committing crime (i.e. they
would have a higher xi).
Following Nagin and Paternoster (1993), we assume that employees may
diﬀer with respect to their initial propensity to oﬀend. Employers are aware
of this heterogeneity but do not observe (perfectly) the individual xi’s.
The ﬁrst-order and second-order conditions for ei are
pei(wi + ei − viwi) − ψei = 0 (2)
peiei(wi + ei − viwi) + pei − ψeiei ≤ 0
respectively. Equation (2) deﬁnes the individual crime level e∗
i(wi,vi,wi,xi).
An employee who chooses not to commit crime receives their wage wi. Thus,
(anticipating e∗
i) the employee will commit crime iﬀ EUC
i (e∗
i) > wi. This
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These results give the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Lower wages, higher prospects of outside employment and
higher propensities to commit crime all make an employee more likely to
commit crime and increase the volume of crime committed by existing crim-
inals, ceteris paribus. The opposite also holds.
It is clear from (4) that some employees will choose to commit crime
while others will not. Equations (5)–(7) tell us how these choices are aﬀected
by labour market variables and individual attitudes towards crime. Higher
wages and higher chances of re-employment both increase a criminal’s vol-
ume of crime, as does a higher propensity for crime. Further, these changes
4Note that we do not present results on w as we do not have data on this below.
7also make a given employee more likely to commit crime in the sense that
her threshold ˆ xi falls. The intuition behind these results is clear. Rational
workers will not risk detection and ﬁring, should they commit a crime, unless
the opportunity cost is low. In our case, this means that their current wage
rate is low or the prospects of re-employment are high.
We might also provide some intuition for the role of x by describing some
of its potential determinants: these will also be required to proxy x in our
empirical work. Nagin and Paternoster (1993) relate “conscience” to the
idea of “social bonds” which, in turn, can be related to the concept of “social
capital” (see Glaeser et al. (2002)). Thus, if we can ﬁnd variables linked to
social capital formation, they may provide useful proxies for x. Glaeser et
al. present evidence that age and education are both positively related to
social capital.5 Bearing this in mind, we suggest that x is negatively related
to age and education (recall that higher x makes crime more likely) and we
use these in our empirical work below. Again, the intuition is uncomplicated:
having ‘invested’ in the existing social structure, the elderly and the better
educated are less inclined to break the rules underpinning it.
Before moving on, we note that the empirical analysis below makes use
5In fact, they ﬁnd a quadratic (inverse-U) relationship between age and social capital
with a turning point at about 50 years of age. Thus, for most employment ages, social
capital and age are positively related. More generally, for a detailed discussion of how
education can reduce crime, see Lochner and Moretti (2001).
8of aggregate (police force area) data. It is clear, however, that the inﬂuences
on crime that we have identiﬁed will remain at this level: the expression for
aggregate employee crime in area k is Ck =
P
i∈Ik Ck
i and it immediately
follows from (4) that this depends on wages, unemployment and the deter-
minants of x, just as the individual crime decision does. Of course, as Koebel
(2002) makes clear, the conditions under which individual decisions will be
mirrored in aggregate data are reasonably restrictive so we should be careful
when interpreting our empirical results. As he continues, however, theory
remains essential for determining the variables of interest in the aggregate
data set (see p. 251)—precisely the sense in which we use our model.
3 Data and methods
Our model suggests that the employee’s decision to commit theft at work will
be inﬂuenced by a mixture of labour market and social factors. In particular,
data on employee crime may be linked with wages and unemployment, as well
as with individual inﬂuences like age and educational attainment. It also
suggests that these inﬂuences will continue to be relevant at the aggregate
level. We now discuss our data on each of these variables.
While we do not have individual data on employee crime, we do have re-
gional information on employee theft. To examine the eﬀects of the variables
9in our model we use aggregated police force area data.6 All 43 police force
areas in England and Wales were originally included, but after aggregating
the City of London and Metropolitan regions (due to low population in the
City of London) and combining Gwent and South Wales (due to a boundary
change), we are left with 41 areas. The empirical analysis to be subsequently
presented is based on pooled cross-section and time-series observations of
41 police force areas from the ﬁnancial year 1995/96 to 1999/00. Although
police force statistics go back many years before 1995 it is very diﬃcult to
ﬁnd regional data on one of our variables, education, for earlier years. Hence
this exercise is constrained by data availability.
The data on employee theft used in this paper are compiled by the Home
Oﬃce. Theft by an employee is deﬁned in part of Section 1 of the Theft
Act 1968.7 We calculate an employee theft rate on the basis of population
estimates by police force area supplied by the Oﬃce for National Statis-
tics. The labour market and demographic measures come from aggregating
individual-level data to police force area using the quarterly UK Labour Force
Survey (LFS). From 1995Q2 onwards, we are able to match individuals using
6Because we focus on only one category of crime such aggregation will not create the
biases discussed by Cherry and List (2002).
7“The theft should be known at the time of recording to have been by an em-
ployee or group of employees. The owner of the property stolen should be the em-
ployee’s employer”: see the Home Oﬃce Counting Rules for Recorded Crime (2002) at
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/countrules.html.
10a county level identiﬁer to the police force area. Unfortunately, the county
identiﬁer was removed from the data ﬁles after 1999Q3, and, therefore, our
estimation sample is restricted to ﬁve years.
We now turn to the two important incentive variables; expected outside
employment (to measure v from our model) and the employee’s wage (cap-
turing w). Our area unemployment rate is derived from the LFS by dividing
the unemployed (International Labour Organisation deﬁnition) by those indi-
viduals who are economically active.8 In computing area level data on wages
from the LFS, observations for men’s wages are restricted to workers aged
between 18 and 65. Observations for women’s wages are restricted to workers
aged between 18 and 60. We derive hourly pay by dividing the gross weekly
wage by the usual weekly paid hours including paid overtime. These wages
are then deﬂated by the retail price index. The model outlined above predicts
that high wage rates reduce crime by increasing its opportunity cost.9
In addition to our labour market measures, we include demographic con-
trols that are assumed to be related to an individual’s “propensity to commit
crime”, namely education and age (i.e. proxies for x). Area level data on ed-
8Of course, a number of other factors beyond the local unemployment rate will help
determine an employee’s probability of re-employment. However, the unemployment rate
will have an important role to play and is the main measure available in the LFS.
9Freeman (1996), Gould et al. (2000), Grogger (1998), Machin and Meghir (2000), and
Viscusi (1986) establish a negative correlation between earnings levels (or wage rates) and
criminal activity in general.
11ucation is sparse in the UK, but the LFS does contain individual data on the
number of qualiﬁcations held. However, given the diﬃculties of identifying
every qualiﬁcation in the LFS questionnaire, we derive the population share
of those with no educational qualiﬁcations.10 The variable for the proportion
of the population in a police force area with no education qualiﬁcations is
designed to measure the possible opportunity cost associated with criminal
activity.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for this set of 41 police force areas.
From the ﬁrst row of the table it can be seen that employee theft numbers
vary widely across police force area and year, varying from 13 oﬀences per
100,000 of the population to around 70 per 100,000 of the population in a
single year (London in 1997/98). The second interesting feature of the data
is that the percentage of the population with no educational qualiﬁcations
varies widely between police force area and year from 8% (Surrey in 1999/00)
to 25% (West Midlands in 1995/96).
The previous section suggests an equation for employee crime in area k








10For a detailed discussion of the academic and vocational qualiﬁcations contained in
the LFS, see Dearden et al. (2002).
12where we postulate that x = g(edu,age).11 Also, to deal with the possibility
of persistence in the level of employee crime (for example, ‘re-oﬀending’ may
occur), we amend the current model to provide a dynamic setting in which
such persistence may arise.12 Therefore, we consider a dynamic speciﬁcation




t = β˜ v
k












for k = 1,...,41 and t = 2,...,5, where ˜ C is the log of employee crime
rate, ˜ v is the log of unemployment rate, ˜ w is log average wage rate,edu is
the share of the population with no educational qualiﬁcations, age is the
average age and where |θ| < 1 and k
t ≡ ηk + µk
t is the usual ﬁxed eﬀects
decomposition of the error term, i.e. ηk is an unobserved police force area-
speciﬁc time-invariant eﬀect which allows for heterogeneity in the means of
the crime series across areas and µk
t is a disturbance term assumed to be
independent across areas.13
To estimate the empirical equation above, two primary issues have to
11If the relationship in g(·) held perfectly, the employer would be able to observe x,
contrary to our assumption. In fact, there will be some noise associated with our empirical
proxies for x. Further, even if the employer could infer likely criminal behaviour from g(·),
it would be illegal to discriminate against a given employee in terms of monitoring on the
basis of age and education—beyond normal probationary training, etc.
12Rob and Zemsky (2002) provide an interesting model where social capital
grows/shrinks through the similar notion of “re-shirking”in a corporate setting.
13Notice that at the individual level, Proposition 1 predicts β < 0, γ < 0, δ > 0, and
φ < 0.
13be confronted. First, while the equation controls for ﬁxed eﬀects, it does
not allow for the possible endogeneity of labour market variables, and so
the results cannot be given a causal interpretation. Fajnzylber et al. (2002)
summarize the problems posed by the use of such methods when modelling
violent crime. Second, it is possible that employee crime rates are measured
with error, and this error may be correlated with some of the regressors. To
assess the eﬀects of both endogeneity and measurement error we implement
a GMM diﬀerence estimator.
4 Results
Table 2 presents OLS estimates of the crime equation in levels and within
groups. Most of the coeﬃcients in the levels regression are not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. The two exceptions are the lagged dependent variable and
age. Area crime rates show a sizeable degree of persistence with an estimate of
0.76 that is highly signiﬁcant. Age is signiﬁcant at the 10-percent level, with
a one-year increase in average age decreasing employee crime by about 4%
in the short-run. The unemployment rate and age have negative coeﬃcients
as suggested by the theoretical model, but are not signiﬁcant. The wage
rate is neither signiﬁcant nor correctly signed, according to the model. The
second column of Table 2 presents within-groups estimates, i.e. all variables
14are expressed in deviations from their area speciﬁc means (taken over time).
The within-groups estimates for area crime rates are quite diﬀerent from
the OLS results. For the lagged dependent variable, the estimate is reduced
to 0.25 suggesting much less persistence in area crime rates.14 The tests
of second-order serial correlation in the residuals for OLS levels and in the
ﬁrst-diﬀerenced residuals for the within groups estimator are in both cases
consistent with the maintained assumption of no serial correlation in k
t.
The results in the second column of Table 2 suggest that ﬁxed eﬀects
are indeed important. In moving from the OLS results to the within-groups
estimates the coeﬃcient on unemployment increases in absolute terms from
-0.054 to -0.197. From the within-groups estimates we see that all eﬀects are
consistent with those suggested in Section 2, although wage, education and
age do not have a signiﬁcant impact. The fact that other variables are not
signiﬁcant suggests that the OLS estimates might be biased downwards for
two reasons. First, the OLS and within-groups results do not control for the
joint endogeneity of some of the explanatory variables. It is likely that the
incidence of employee theft not only is driven by but also aﬀects a number
of labour and demographic variables. For example, crime may aﬀect an
14As expected in the presence of area-speciﬁc eﬀects, OLS levels appears to give an
upwards-biased estimate of the coeﬃcient on the lagged dependent variable, whilst the
within-groups estimate appears to give a downwards-biased estimate of this coeﬃcient
(see Bond (2002)).
15individual’s human capital acquisition and, then, aﬀect earnings potential
as well. Second, measurement error in the employee theft series might be
correlated with some of the explanatory variables, particularly wage rates.
To deal with endogeneity and to eliminate the area-speciﬁc eﬀect, we ﬁrst-
diﬀerence the crime equation and estimate with GMM, using lagged levels
of crime, unemployment, wage and education as instruments. These results
are shown in column 1 of Table 3. The result is to increase the coeﬃcient
on unemployment and to increase substantially the estimate on the wage
variable. The coeﬃcient on the lagged dependent variable is only 0.27, and
the elasticity of crime with respect to wage is around 2.0, suggesting a high
opportunity cost of illegal behaviour. The null hypothesis of no second or-
der serial correlation cannot be rejected. Taking a look at the Sargan test,
the p-value indicates that the instruments are not rejected. However, this
does not mean the instruments are informative and strong.15 To address this
concern, we use the system-GMM estimator in column 2. Using diﬀerences
as instruments for the levels substantially improves the precision of our es-
timates, and the extended set of moment restrictions is not rejected by the
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions.
15Indeed, in unreported results, we ﬁnd that weak instruments cannot be rejected us-
ing the partial R2 or ﬁrst-stage F-statistic criteria. If the instruments used in the ﬁrst
diﬀerenced equations are weak, then the results should be biased in the direction of within-
groups (see Blundell and Bond (2000)).
16All our coeﬃcients have signs which are consistent with the hypotheses
in Section 2 and are all signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient on the lagged dependent
variable is 0.52, and the elasticity of crime with respect to wage is a more
plausible 0.6. The eﬀect of unemployment is consistently negative across
all regressions, and is highly signiﬁcant in the system-GMM estimator. The
elasticity of crime with respect to unemployment is roughly 0.75. The share of
the population with no educational qualiﬁcations has a positive and strongly
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. This is consistent with our theoretical model. Given
that older people are less likely to engage in criminal activity, a negative
correlation is anticipated between average age and crime (as Proposition 1
predicts). Our results indicate that age is strongly signiﬁcant and correctly
signed.
5 Conclusions
Despite considerable interest from economists in the relationship between
economic activity and criminal behaviour, little attention has been paid to
the determinants of employee crime. This is despite that fact that surveys
on both sides of the Atlantic suggest that such crime costs the economy
billions each year (in direct and indirect—monitoring—costs). Only Barnes
and Lambell (2002) produce econometric work in this area but they rely on
17organisations’ “perceptions” of their susceptability to crime. The results are
valuable but are open to natural questions about the reliability of reporting
and whether diﬀerent interviewees could have diﬀerent perceptions of the
issue at hand. For the ﬁrst time, this paper seeks to examine the determinants
of employee crime (speciﬁcally theft) from recorded crime data.
To motivate our empirical work, we use a model where ‘rational cheaters’
are also motivated by conscience when deciding whether to commit crime.
Our predictions suggest that wage levels and unemployment will have simi-
lar qualitative eﬀects on employee thefts (with increases in both serving to
lower crime rates) while ‘social’ inﬂuences (from age and education) are also
predicted to inﬂuence crime: older, better educated individuals being less
likely to commit crime. Our econometric results support these predictions.
We also ﬁnd evidence of persistence in employee crime.
These results have two sets of implications. First, they support ﬁndings
in work by Nagin and others (e.g. Nagin and Paternoster (1993) and Nagin
et al. (2002)) that suggest criminal activity is generated by more than sim-
ple economic inﬂuences. While employees are apparently ‘rational cheaters’,
motivated by the incentives to remain employed at a good wage, our model
and results also suggest a role for individual conscience and desire to support
existing social structures and rules when they are making decisions about
crime. This result may have implications for theories of social capital forma-
18tion and for the modelling economic activity (at least in relation to crime).
The second implication of our results concerns potential policies that may
help address employee crime. In common with other work on the relationship
between economic activity and crime, we ﬁnd a role for labour market condi-
tions in the crime decision. However, to the extent that low unemployment
and high wages are linked, this relationship is not a simple one. Our results
also suggest a role for broader social policies which may encourage employees
to regard their job as being part of their wider social setting.
Although our use of recorded crime data is new, there are several questions
that cannot be addressed with data at the level of aggregation currently
available in the UK. This immediately suggests a need for more detailed
data collection (through oﬃcial or research channels) in order to help us
understand employee crime. It would be useful to examine the break-down
in crime by industry and region and also to consider the role played by
monitoring technology used by employers. Further, of course, individual-
level data would allow aggregation questions to be immediately addressed
and, thereby, enable direct testing of individual-level models of employee
crime. In this way, a relatively neglected, but economically signiﬁcant, area
of crime could be better understood. The current paper has sought to help
begin this process.
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23Table 1: Descriptive statistics for 41 Police Force Areas, 1995/96-1999/2000 
  
                                                                     median                    mean                 stan.dev.             min.                   max 
Employee theft per 100,000 pop’n  26.37  27.97  9.05  13.05  69.37 
Unemployment  rate  (%)  6.06 6.26 2.21 2.17 14.11 
Average  hourly  wage  (£)  7.37 7.65 1.05 6.07 11.66 
Share of Population with no 
educational qualifications 
0.163 0.166 0.037 0.080 0.250 
Average Age (years)  39.10  39.12  0.65  37.27  40.92 
The sample contains police force areas with 5 years of complete data. The number of police force areas in the sample is 41 for a total 
number of 205 observations. Table 2: OLS Estimates of Employee Crime 
LEVELS WITHIN-GROUPS   
Estimate SE Estimate SE 
      
Log Unemployment Rate  -0.0540  0.0616  -0.1970  0.0859 
Log Average Real Hourly Wage  0.2141  0.1854  -0.0459  0.3508 
Share of Population with No Educational 
Qualifications 
0.4050 0.5772 0.8275 0.7910 
Average Age  -0.0393  0.0231  -0.0170  0.0540 
Lagged Dependent Variable  0.7605  0.0492  0.2482  0.1099 
    
Police Force Area Fixed Effects  No  Yes 
R-Squared 0.7036  0.5359 
Sample size  164  164 
    
 DIAGNOSTIC  TESTS  (p-values) 
First-Order Serial Correlation  0.898  0.003 
Second-Order Serial Correlation  0.366  0.633 
    
 
Notes: 
1.  The dependent variable is Log(employee theft/population). 
2.  Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
3.  The tests for serial correlation in the residuals is asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial 
correlation. Table 3: GMM Estimates of Employee Crime 
FIRST-DIFFERENCES SYSTEM   
Estimate SE Estimate SE 
      
Log Unemployment Rate  -0.3782  0.0543  -0.3573  0.0207 
Log Average Real Hourly Wage  -1.5479  0.3744  -0.2849  0.0860 
Share of Population with No Educational 
Qualifications 
-1.1972 1.1084 1.1418 0.3503 
Average Age  -0.0345  0.0390  -0.1386  0.0113 
Lagged Dependent Variable  0.2652  0.0793  0.5151  0.0400 
    
    
 DIAGNOSTIC  TESTS  (p-values) 
First-Order Serial Correlation  0.068  0.002 
Second-Order Serial Correlation  0.787  0.465 
    
Sargan  Test 0.211  0.600 
(df) (20)  (32) 
 
Notes: 
4.  Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
5.  The results reported here are based on two-step GMM estimators. All computations are done using DPD98 for 
Gauss: see Arellano, M. and Bond, S. (1998): Dynamic Panel Data Estimation Using DPD98: A Guide for 
Users. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
6.  The tests for serial correlation in the residuals is asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial 
correlation. 
7.  In the first-differences estimator, the instrumental variables are the levels of the period t – 2, t – 3 and t – 4 for 
employee crime, unemployment, wage and no educational qualifications. Age is treated as exogenous and is 
instrumented by itself. In the system estimator, the crime equation in first-differences is estimated jointly with 
the crime equation in levels. The instrumental variables for the first-differenced equation are the levels of the 
period t – 2, t – 3 and t – 4 for lagged employee crime, unemployment, wage and no educational 
qualifications. The instrumental variables for levels equation are the first-differences for the period t – 1 for 
lagged employee crime, unemployment, wage and no educational qualifications. Additional instruments used 
are the first-difference and level of age. 
8.  The test of the over-identifying restrictions, called a Sargan test, is asymptotically distributed as  ()
2
p n- c , 
where n is the number of instruments and p is the number of parameters, under the null of instrument validity. 
Degrees of freedom reported in parentheses. 
 